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LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (CHICAGO: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
PRESS, 2005). PP. 289.

Today, we live in the "confession era" of criminal law: a defendant's
inculpation of himself is the golden ring for which prosecutors always
reach. Police procedures are structured around it, as are vast swaths of
criminal procedure doctrine, from Escobedo to Miranda to Dickerson.
Knowing sophisticated and reliable techniques for interpreting these
confessions is thus fundamentally useful to lawyers and judges.
In
Speaking of Crime: The Language of CriminalJustice, Lawrence M. Solan
and Peter M. Tiersma provide a sweeping introduction to the state of the art
in forensic linguistics, providing the reader with just such techniques. This
makes their book indispensable to the modem practitioner.' At the same
time I commend Solan and Tiersma in this review for making forensic
linguistics accessible to the novice, I am also going to suggest that the
confession era is coming to a close. As new technologies develop, such as
DNA identification, fMRI "lie detector" tests, and "data fingerprinting" on
the interet, I predict that courts will rely less and less on confessions and
their artifacts altogether, ironically rendering our need for linguistic
sophistication in this area of the criminal law less important.
Of course, we are not out of the confession era yet (if in fact we ever
will be), and in Part I of this review, I will outline this book's many
contributions to understanding issues of language that are so central to the
. Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. A.B.
Harvard College; J.D. The University of Chicago Law School; M.A. Princeton University;
Ph.D. Princeton University.
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criminal law today. I will also touch on the other areas of criminal law that
Solan and Tiersma discuss, because their aims are quite broad. In Part II, I
will make the case for my speculation that in the near future, emerging
technologies will render confessions, and related phenomena such as
consensual searches and requests for attorneys before interrogations, mostly
obsolete. I will further argue that, consistent with past technological
innovations in criminal evidence, the judicial system will continue to focus
on traditional confessions well past the point where they contribute
helpfully to the search for truth in trials, partly out of habit, and partly out
of skittishness about the perceived (and I believe false) power of the new
technologies to displace trials altogether.
I.
If you were to leave the rest of the book untouched, reading the first of
the book's four sections (really, even just Chapter 2) would adequately
acquaint you with the bulk of the linguistic tools Solan and Tiersma employ
to resolve most of the criminal law problems they discuss. Though many
lively debates continue in linguistics, they argue that much of importance is
well-settled: "We now know a great deal about what makes language plain
when it is plain, and what makes language vague or ambiguous when it is
unclear.... We also know how the structure of a discourse affects the
2
inferences that people are likely to draw from the language that they hear.",
The authors lucidly explain this body of knowledge to their readersthough I confess I would have liked more flesh in this overview chapter,
even if it came at the expense of perfect clarity to the complete novice.
Their discussion of "sound systems" (the way different languages voiceand sometimes confuse-different sounds at different parts of words and
sentences),3 syntax,4 and the differences between the "definitional" (a list of
necessary and sufficient conditions) versus "prototypical" (based on
experience and understanding) approaches to word meaning 5 are somewhat
disappointingly brief, especially given that they don't return to these issues
at any real length or technical detail later in other chapters. In contrast,
their introduction to pragmatics 6 -that is, the understanding of language
through both verbal and circumstantial context-is both clear and thorough;
better yet, they return to it time and again throughout the book so that the
reader gains real facility with the concepts.
2

Id. at 15.

' Id.at 16-18.
4 Id. at 18-20.
5 Id. at 20-23.
6

Id. at 23-26.
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Indeed, this book is less about the science of linguistics generally, and
more about the application of pragmatics to criminal law specifically.
When divorced from context, language as spoken or written is hopelessly
ambiguous. To illustrate this point, Solan and Tiersma offer the example of
the simple statement, "It's two o'clock." Taken purely at face value, this is
"nothing more than a statement about the time of day."7 Yet because we
assume that the speaker is a conversational partner interested in cooperating
with us in a shared endeavor to express meaning, 8 we can infer from context
what the speaker intended to say when she spoke her words:
[W]hen uttered by one concerned parent to another, it may be a way of saying, 'I'm
worried about our teenager not being home yet,' even though worry is never
mentioned. When uttered by a teacher at the end of a test, it may mean 'Time is up.'
When uttered by a sports fan, it may mean, 'The game is about to start.'

It is of course this very ambiguity that causes repeated problems that
courts must solve, and Solan and Tiersma's ambition is to raise the level of
technical precision in legal discussions and resolutions of these problems.
After the first two introductory chapters, the authors organize the rest
of the book into sections roughly organized around criminal procedure, the
boundaries of expert linguistic testimony, and substantive criminal law.
However, notwithstanding an interesting, but stand-alone, foray into the
science of voice- and writing-identification in Chapters 7 and 8 and a final,
exhortatory chapter that summarizes all of their policy recommendations,
linguistic pragmatics is the unifying theme that runs throughout the entire
book. The theme has two basic strands, which I expand on below. First, by
offering repeated problems and solving them by using pragmatics, Solan
and Tiersma provide the reader with a solid "how to" guide for solving
other interpretation problems in the law. Second, the authors systematically
uncover startling inconsistencies in courts' actual use of pragmatics to solve
interpretation dilemmas.
A.
All of the following are established doctrines of criminal law and
procedure: law enforcement personnel do not need to secure a warrant if a
suspect consents to a search after a request-not a command-from a
police officer.1l Police must immediately stop interrogating a suspect and
7 Id. at 23-24.
8 For this recurrent point, the authors cite to H.P. Grice's seminal work on the
Cooperative Principle of conversation.

Id. at 8 (citing H.P. GRICE,

CONVERSATION (1975)).
9

Id. at 24.

10Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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allow him to consult a lawyer as soon as he explicitly asks for one." Literal
truth (even though deceptive) is a complete defense to a charge of perjury.' 2
Mere predictions about future harms, 3 or explicit, though menacing,
political commentaries,' 4 do not count as convictable threats.
But what is the legal difference between a request ("May I have a look
inside your car?") and a command ("Let me look inside your car")? How
can we tell the difference between a genuine request ("Please let me talk to
my lawyer") and a mere musing ("It would be nice if I could see my
lawyer")? What makes a lie, a lie and not just a nonresponsive answer to a
question? What makes a threat, a threat and not a warning or dramatic
hyperbole? The distinctions, of course, are critical to the law, and courts
are constantly called upon to make them.
Solan and Tiersma very convincingly make the case that all of these
distinctions can only be drawn pragmatically. Take the example they offer,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.15 During a traffic stop for burnt headlamp and
license plate lights, a police officer asked the driver, "Does the trunk open?"
The driver answered "yes," and opened the trunk. Inside, the police found
three stolen checks.' 6 Did the police make a request to search the trunk?
Obviously the officer was "not [making] an inquiry into the design of the
automobile or the condition of the trunk,"' 17 and so the Court interpreted the
question "Does the trunk open?" as a request to examine the contents of the
trunk. It was context alone that suggested this reading. Had the questioner
been a customer and the questionee a used car salesman, then the question
might have more appropriately been taken literally. But here, the
questioner was a police officer and the circumstance was a traffic stop. Had
the citizen merely answered "yes" with no move to open the trunk, the
police officer would have rightly regarded the response as obstreperous.
Solan and Tiersma point out that while courts instinctively use
linguistic pragmatics to interpret the words of police officers in exchanges
with citizens, their usually-subconscious and untutored applications can be
wooden or one-sided. In Bustamonte, the Court took for granted that a
question which on its face was about whether a trunk could open, was a
request by the officer to open it. However, they did not consider another
linguistically-plausible reading: given the context of a legitimate traffic stop
11 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
12 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
13 Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. NLRB, 36 F.3d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
14 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
'5412 U.S. 218 (1973).
16 Id.at 220.
17 SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 1, at 24.
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and a police officer acting in his official capacity, most people would
consider the words not as a request, but as a command. Solan and Tiersma
argue that the Court's error was in considering only whether the officer
'8
intended to convey a request to open the trunk (the "illocutionary force"'
of his words), rather than on how the driver heard the words (the
"perlocutionary effect"19). The error is made all the worse because there
was nothing in the actual language of the police officer that would have
clued the citizen in to the fact that the coercive phase of the interaction had
ended (that is, being required to pull over and step out of the car), and the
optional phase begun (the consensual search of the automobile).2 °
This is but one instance where Solan and Tiersma walk the reader
through an interpretive problem and solve it using pragmatics. Through
extensive examples, the authors clarify many other language problems that
come up again and again in criminal law. For instance, they demonstrate
why courts should be especially careful about questions that begin "Do you
mind" or "You don't mind," since these openers confuse the normal rule
about the meaning of an affirmative response: a "yes" answer to "Do you
mind if I search the trunk?" could mean either "Go ahead and search the
trunk" or "I certainly do mind if you search the trunk!",2 1 In another
extended example, they help us understand why suspects rarely forcefully
assert their right to speak to a lawyer before being interrogated; namely, as
is usual with people who carry less power in any interaction,2 2 the language
suspects use to invoke their rights tends to be indirect.
They do similar work in the chapters on the substantive criminal law
doctrines of solicitation/conspiracy, threats and perjury-that is, they walk
the reader through several problems, with each one adding interpretive
complexity. Given the recent I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby indictment, the
chapter on perjury is particularly interesting: using pragmatics, the authors
18

Id. at 25.

'9

Id. at 26.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 42-43.

20
21

22 Solan and Tiersma cite to JOHN CONLEY & WILLIAM O'BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW,

LANGUAGE, AND POWER 65-66 (1998), SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 1, at 60, but they
might also have cited to interesting work in social psychology by Susan Fiske and others,
showing that the more-powerful interaction partner (here, the police) is less likely to
perceive the needs or requests of the less-powerful partner (here, the suspect), and are more
likely to base their impressions on stereotypic information rather than on actual attributes
possessed by the less powerful target. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Other People:
The Impact of Power on Stereotyping, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 621 (1993); Stephanie A.
Goodwin, Alexandra Gubin, Susan T. Fiske & Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, Power Can Bias
Impression Processes: Stereotyping Subordinates by Default and by Design, 3 GROUP
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 227 (2000).
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convincingly demonstrate why the bright-line "literal truth" defense to
perjury is far dimmer than it first appears.
Solan and Tiersma's extensive instruction in linguistic pragmatics
should not feel foreign to their target audience: in many ways, they are just
providing further lessons in "thinking like a lawyer." That is, Solan and
Tiersma emphasize careful, close textual analysis coupled with sensitivity
to alternative meanings based on circumstances. The advantage of this
approach is its familiarity. The disadvantage is that it weakens the claim
that their pragmatic approach answers legal problems in a unique and
definitive way-something the authors implicitly acknowledge when they
note, "Roughly speaking, pragmatic information can include just about
anything beyond the actual language of an utterance. 23 Lawyers can
virtually always make plausible counterarguments for considering a large
set of possible interpretations or for construing a situation in different ways.
For instance, Solan and Tiersma ask, "Why . . .would any rational
person ever agree to let the police search his possessions," especially when
they know they are concealing contraband? 24 They use the context of the
citizen's guilty knowledge as dispositive evidence for their pragmatic
interpretation that a citizen who "allowed" such a search must necessarily
have perceived the officer's "request" as a command.25 Yet a skilled lawyer
(or even just a good amateur psychologist) could argue something like the
following: given the ambiguities of suspicion, coupled with the intuition
that police officers, like everyone else, can be lazy, a citizen carrying
contraband might hope that the officer's request is, essentially, a bluff: if
she says "yes" to the request, the officer might decide to not bother with the
search. After all, as Solan and Tiersma point out, why bother looking when
no one with contraband is likely to invite the search?
Further, a citizen might worry that answering "no" will convert the
officer's mild interest into full-blown suspicion (what does she have to
hide?). Though legally, of course, answering "no" to the request could not
itself constitute probable cause to search, lest the request be a meaningless
game-but it would be surprising if the refusal had no effect at all on an
officer's assessment of the situation. And it would be equally surprising if
rational citizens did not intuit this and act accordingly. 26 These two
23 SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note

1, at 44.
24Id.at 27.
25 See, e.g., id. at 45-46, 48.
26 Consider a real example offered by the hip hop artist Jay-Z (born Shawn Carter). In a
song, he describes a traffic stop he experienced in 1994, which he believes was racially
motivated. The officer asked to search the car, and Jay-Z, knowing his rights, refused. The
officer retorted, "We'll see how smart you are when the K-9's come." JAY-Z, 99 Problems,
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interpretations do not exhaust the possibilities, either. In her own writings
on the subject, Janice Nadler has listed several other reasons rational, guilty
people might consent to a search, other than because they believe it to be a
command. 27 Bustamonte itself seems like a good example-though the
driver lost his gamble, odds were high from the outset that a police officer
performing a cursory search in the middle of the night would not find three
wadded-up stolen checks inside a probably junk-laden (if my own is
representative) car trunk.
In the end, why citizens acquiesce at such high rates to officers'
requests to search is a tricky empirical question that at least one scholar has
tried to answer, as I will discuss later. But my larger point here is not to
criticize Solan and Tiersma's approach to these problems. It is in fact the
opposite. Solan and Tiersma enrich our interpretive vocabulary, and
provide new tools for increasing the precision of the arguments lawyers and
judges already intuitively know how to make. This book helps the reader
improve the kind of analysis that recurs throughout the law-and not just in
the criminal arena-by more rigorously flexing mental muscles that our
own discipline has already toned.
B.
If the authors' first goal is to teach the reader how to employ linguistic
pragmatics in a principled, rigorous way, their second is to reveal how
unrigorously, and inconsistently, the courts currently use it. Consider, for
28
example, "performative speech acts," such as verbal requests for a lawyer.
Speech acts are legal magic words: they do something. In the case of a
request for a lawyer, the police must cease interrogation completely until
the suspect has had access to her attorney. 29 There are other performative
speech acts in the criminal law, such as the substantive crimes of threat,
solicitation and perjury. (Noncriminal analogues are things like contracts,
or slander.) If each type of statement were constructed "I hereby such-andsuch" (such as "I hereby request a lawyer," or "I hereby inform you that if
you testify against me in court, I will kill you,") they would be

on THE BLACK ALBUM (Def Jam 2003). In the end, the canine unit was unavailable, and the
officer let Jay-Z drive away-but there is no doubt in the description that Jay-Z felt he was
between a rock and hard place in replying to the officer's request. Shaheem Reid, Jay-Z:
What More Can I Say, MTV.COM, http://www.mtv.com/bands/j/jay-z/news-featurel 12103/
(last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
27 Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002
SUP. CT. REv. 153, 165-66 n.27.
28 Id.

29 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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unambiguous speech acts. 30 Even without the "I hereby" prefix, with a
plain performative statement ("I request a lawyer," "If you testify, I will kill
you,") there would be no need to use pragmatics to identify them.
But of course people rarely talk that way. For reasons of politeness, 31
or euphonics, 32 or powerlessness, 33 we tend to speak indirectly and
imprecisely. In personal interactions, we unconsciously employ pragmatic
analysis to discern meaning on the fly. But the formal legal system has the
option of insisting on literal readings of speech acts. Solan and Tiersma
point out that the law treats different categories of speech acts differently in
whether they are willing to use pragmatics, or instead require literal
interpretations to identify them. For perjury, the law explicitly refuses to
engage in pragmatic interpretation.34 Thus, if on cross examination a
lawyer asks a witness, "Do you have a Chevy?" and receives the answer, "I
have a Ford," the witness has not committed perjury even if he has a Chevy,
as well.35 In contrast, the law is expansive in reading even quite obscure
intimidations as threats. 36 Thus, "It sure would be a shame if someone
messed up that pretty face" would certainly be a criminal act if uttered by a
stranger to a lone woman in a dark alley.
Inconsistency like this, across different speech acts, is relatively
unproblematic. We can-and Solan and Tiersma do-articulate good
reasons for having different rules about literalism in these two areas. When
it comes to perjury, cross examining lawyers already have the upper hand
by getting to frame and order the questions, thus they have a great deal of
power to manipulate the meaning of witnesses' answers. "It would skew
the power relationship between lawyer and witness even more if witnesses
could be prosecuted for creating a misleading impression in a dialogue in
which the questioner is doing exactly the same thing., 37 No such worries
arise in the case of threats, however. Indeed, allowing criminals to escape
prosecution through a little creative wordplay would effectively evaporate
laws against mugging, extortion, bribery, solicitation, etc.
30 SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note

1,at 25.

" Id.at 38-42.
32 Id.at 19.
13 Id. at 59-61.
34 Id.at

215. As noted above, Solan and Tiersma point out that it is impossible for courts
to truly demand literalism in perjury, but relative to other performative criminal speech acts,
it is definitely at the extreme of the spectrum in its refusal to engage in pragmatic
interpretation.
35Id.at 214. Solan and Tiersma show that this example is parallel to the exchange in
Bronston.
36 Id.at 204-07.
37 Id.at 216.
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Other inconsistencies, however, are more troubling. One of the most
important contributions of Speaking of Crime is its unveiling of the
indefensibly lopsided approach courts have taken with linguistic analysis in
certain areas. I have already related their description of how courts
implicitly use pragmatics to decide whether a statement by the police such
as "Does the trunk open?" or "Do you mind if I take a look around?" is in
fact a request to search, while refusing to engage in the same sort of
pragmatic openness in considering whether the exact same questions are, in
fact, commands to search.38 But Solan and Tiersma offer countless other
examples, such as that courts have frequently refused to rule that indirect
requests by a suspect to speak to a lawyer trigger the requirement that the
police stop an interrogation and fulfill the request. They have instead
demanded from untrained citizens the very kind of literalism they have
found unreasonable to expect of a trained police officer. Thus, a suspect
who said that he "felt like he might want" to talk to a lawyer, and even
those who said, "I think I would like to talk to a lawyer," "I think I might
need a lawyer," and "Maybe I need a lawyer," were all held not to have
requested a lawyer. 39 The contrast with courts' pragmatic approach to
interpreting police requests to search without a warrant is striking, and
Solan and Tiersma make a compelling case that the courts should not be
allowed to have it both ways.
II.

Occasionally, Solan and Tiersma's concerns seem dwarfed by
considerations that even the most sophisticated linguistic analysis can't
address. Solan and Tiersma know this, yet even while acknowledging it,
they sometimes seem to underappreciate the point. Take as an example
their discussion of jailhouse snitching, in which they emphasize the
unreliability of confessions that are necessarily based only on the "gist" of
what a suspect said to a cellmate. In analyzing the problem, they write,
"The problem is not just that cellmates have a stake in lying. It is
exacerbated by the fact that witnesses can do a fairly good job insulating
themselves from strong cross-examination by never having to give much
detail about what the defendant actually said., 40 True enough; the fact that
we have no way to use the fine grained tools of linguistics to analyze a
defendant's "confession" does indeed add to the problem of letting snitches
testify. Yet the motive cellmates have to lie is so overwhelming, it simply
dominates the scene. Focusing on the linguistic qualities of such a
" Id.
at 45.
31 Id.at 57-58.
40

Id. at 112.
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confession feels like worrying that we can't band-aid the toe of a man who
may be missing his whole leg.
For another example, consider something I have already discussed:
courts' reliable inconsistency in applying literalism versus pragmatics to
interpretations of officers' requests to search, or suspects' requests for
attorneys. The inconsistency itself is not really the problem, it is the
underlying reasons for the inconsistency. First, judges assume that most
criminal defendants are guilty. Second, they assume that police officers
rarely manipulate suspects or lie under oath. The first assumption is almost
certainly true, but sadly, the second assumption is far more questionable.
Christopher Slobogin wrote a devastating article about the phenomenon of
"testilying," which is slang for police lying under oath (usually when they
are convinced the defendant is guilty) and prosecutors turning a blind eye.
Slobogin cited various sources that claimed the phenomenon is
"commonplace," and may occur in as many as half of all criminal evidence
suppression hearings. 41 Here again, tightly examining the "actual words"
used by police and defendants in the context of confessions, searches and
interrogations seems beside the point, when the words reported may have
been stitched from whole cloth.
Following Solan and Tiersma's sensible recommendation to simply
record all police-suspect interactions could not cure the problem entirely.
For one thing, and as the authors fully admit, the power differentials
between police and citizens are so great that citizens are likely to feel
coerced no matter how officers frames their requests.42 This has been
empirically demonstrated in a study of "consensual" searches following
traffic stops. Out of a random sample of fifty-four requests to search made
by officers of the Ohio Highway Patrol, a full forty-nine citizens conceded
that they gave permission-and all but two of them reported doing so
because they were worried about what would happen to them or their
automobiles if they said "no.''3 Moreover, requiring recordings in
suppression hearings would not stop corrupt police from starting the tape
rolling after coercing suspects into saying what they wanted them to say, or
from simply strategically editing the tapes. And of course jailhouse
confessions couldn't be recorded even in theory.

41 Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COL.

L. REV.1037, 1041-42 (1996).
42 SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 1, at 48.
43 Ilya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or Obedience to Authority: An Inquiry into
the "Consensual" Police-Citizen Encounter 163-64 (unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Rutgers University), cited in Nadler, supra note 27, at 202.
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Still, recording police-citizen interactions would certainly reduce
problems, presumably both by keeping rogue or careless officers relatively
in check, and by allowing courts to more systematically evaluate the nature
of the interactions. And as I've already discussed, we could read Solan and
Tiersma less as advocating consistency per se, and more as just urging
judicial transparency: rather than allowing judges to be wordlessly selective
in applying linguistic pragmatics, we ought to demand that they articulate
why they choose to be expansive in some cases and literal in others. Giving
police officers the benefit of any doubts is not necessarily the wrong policy,
but we should be very clear that we are trading off equality (for it is the
least powerful populations who are disproportionately harmed by these
judicial inconsistencies) and perceived legitimacy for increased social
order. By uncovering the inconsistencies we are implicitly demanding that
judges articulate their reasons for it, which enables us to ultimately decide if
the exchange is worth it.
But if this reading of the importance of linguistic analysis saves Solan
and Tiersma from occasionally seeming a bit beside the point, I am going to
argue now that an even more fundamental threat looms on the horizon.
Namely, advances in technology are rendering the "confession era" itself
obsolete.
By the confession era, I mean the justice system's reliance on face-toface confessions and other low-level interactions between suspects and
investigators. If law enforcement could get all it needed by DNA evidence
(of the suspect at the crime scene, or pieces of the crime scene on the
suspect), coupled with high-tech "lie detector" tests that actually worked,
we would not need Columbo-style police detectives who specialize in
extracting confessions from recalcitrant suspects, using their powerful
understanding of criminal psychology. At best such confessions would be
redundant, and at worst they could be inaccurate. With more powerful tools
for securing demonstrative evidence, we would also not care as much about
requests for attorneys before interrogation, because we wouldn't be relying
on interrogations so heavily. Also, in a world where fraud conspiracies and
drug trafficking depended on the use of computer-based banking,
communication and distribution channels, we also wouldn't care as much
about randomly stumbling onto evidence during a traffic stop--we would
use computer technologies to both identify and intercede in criminal
wrongdoing at a level several times removed from the street. In sum,
improved technologies would render oral confessions and other artifacts of
the confession era relatively obsolete. And if this happened, then our need
for linguistic sophistication in managing and interpreting these phenomena
would all but disappear.
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We aren't in that world yet. As it stands today, confessions are
perceived as central to policing. The Supreme Court itself stated the
conventional wisdom in Arizona v. Fulminante: "A confession is like no
other evidence. Indeed, the defendant's own confession is probably the
most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.
The admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most
knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past
conduct.""
Researchers have empirically assessed the proportion of
successful prosecutions for which a defendant's confession was deemed
necessary to conviction. Though these are necessarily complicated and
somewhat subjective determinations, one scholar, Paul Cassell, examined
several such studies and conservatively estimated that historically, around a
quarter of convictions have depended on the confession of the defendant.4 5
In addition to being seen as necessary to a sizeable proportion of
convictions, confessions are valued for their efficiency.
An early
confession can save a police department a lot of time and money, because
rather than engaging in an expensive and protracted investigation, they can
stop-or at least wind down-their efforts once a perpetrator admits to the
crime.
Still, everything I wrote in the last paragraph was truer in the recent
past than it is today. And in the not-too-distant future, I predict that all of it
will be almost completely false. Let us begin with the Court's statement
that a defendant himself is undoubtedly "the most knowledgeable and
unimpeachable source of information" about his own role in a crime. 4 1 It
seems like every week we read about yet another convicted felon,
sometimes waiting on death row for his execution, who both confessed to a
heinous crime and was later exonerated by post-conviction DNA
evidence.4 7 There are many reasons a suspect may falsely confess-among
them, the power/coercion problems I have already discussed, mental illness,
confusion, or a misplaced guilty conscience-but it's safe to say that the
words of the defendant are not the very best evidence of his guilt. As we
are painfully learning, we'd much rather have something more objective to
rely upon.

44 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (internal quotations omitted).
45 Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L.

REv. 387, 422-37 (1996).
46 Fulminante,499 U.S. at 295.
47 As of December 15, 2005, the Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School claims that
172 convicted felons have been proven innocent via the use of post-conviction DNA testing.
See The Innocence Project, www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Dec. 15, 2005).
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Consider next the statistic that approximately 25% of convictions have
historically depended on confessions. I cannot find any data on the current
proportion of convictions that rely on confessions-but I have reason to
suspect that it has decreased. The first conviction in the world using DNA
evidence happened only as recently as 1987, in the U.K. rape prosecution of
Robert Melias.4 8 The science of DNA testing did not hit the mainstream of
criminal investigations until the 1990's in this country, 49 and as this
evidence has come to play an increasingly integral part in prosecutions,
undoubtedly the number of cases that depend on the "old school" method of
oral confessions would have gone down. Only two of the studies in
Cassell's review took place after 1987: one was a study of three counties in
California in 1993, and another (his own) was a study of Salt Lake City
cases in 1994.50 Both found a similar proportion of cases that relied on
confession (about a quarter)-but these two studies were too early in the
history of DNA evidence to reveal much. It would be surprising if the nowubiquitous use of DNA evidence to solve questions didn't cut into that
proportion significantly-and the ratio should shrink even further as the
techniques improve.
Finally, compared to modem DNA evidence, oral confessions don't
even seem particularly cost effective. A laboratory test comparing a
suspect's DNA to that found at a crime scene is fairly cheap, and becoming
more so as courts take judicial notice of the reliability of the techniques
rather than requiring extensive foundational expert testimony, and as the
techniques themselves have become less costly. Indeed, as long ago as the
late 1990's in the U.K., officials believed that the use of DNA evidence had
reduced the overall cost of law enforcement, given police no longer had to
rely as much on more traditional gum-shoe investigating. 51 Now, scientists
are on the brink of bringing a cheap, portable "chip based" DNA test to
market that would allow investigators to immediately analyze DNA at the
scene of the crime.52 Even laboratory errors should decline as DNA
48

See

NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE

DNA

WARS ARE OVER

(1996), available at

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/revolution/wars.html.
49 The history of the admissibility of DNA evidence in criminal cases is detailed in the
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996),
availableat http://www.nap.edu/books/030905395 1/html.
50 Cassell, supra note 45, at 432.
51 VICTOR WALTER WEEDN & JOHN W. HICKS, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE UNREALIZED POTENTIAL OF DNA TESTING 6 (1998), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/170596.pdf.
52 Mark Hollmer, Network Biosystems Puts Its Chips in DNA Analysis, BOSTON Bus. J.,
JUSTICE,

Jan. 2, 2004, at 9, available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/boston/stories/2004/01/05/
story8.html.
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expertise becomes more widespread and protocols for handling and
processing the evidence become more systematic and widely accepted. 3
(Not to mention that tests conducted immediately on-site would be subject
to fewer problems of cross-contamination or breaks in the chain of
custody-or of deliberate planting of inculpatory evidence.)
DNA evidence (for now) is used for violent crimes such as homicide
and rape, which make up a relatively small proportion of the crimes
committed each year. Won't oral confessions still be critical to far-moreprevalent burglaries, bank robberies, drug crimes and the like? There is
reason to believe not. For one thing, as the amount of biological material
required for DNA testing goes down, its promise in crimes such as
burglaries goes up. 54 More importantly, advances in DNA testing are not
the only emerging technologies to increase the sophistication of forensic
science.
Researchers have already developed functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) techniques that could measure whether a
suspect has previously seen an image (of, say a crime scene) displayed in a
photograph. These techniques would have equal promise for both violent
and nonviolent crimes. The techniques are currently in their infancy and
would not likely be considered reliable
enough for admission in a court of
55
law; however, they improve daily.
53 This is not to say that laboratory error--or, of course, deliberate mishandling-can
ever be completely eliminated. However, though gross violations of laboratory standards do
crop up, see Houston Chronicle, Hot Topic: HPD Crime Lab (last visited Dec. 30, 2005),
http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/special/03/crimelab/index.html,
available
at
standards continue to improve, see COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC Sci., NAT'L RESEARCH
available at
COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF DNA EVIDENCE 75-88 (1996),
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309053951/htm/75.html. Moreover, researchers have found
that jurors do discount the probity of DNA evidence due to laboratory error rates-if
anything, more than they should. See Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror
Understanding of DNA Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for
Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small Random-Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395
(2005).
54 Richard C. Li & Howard A. Harris, Using HydrophilicAdhesive Tapefor Collection of
Evidence for Forensic DNA Analysis, 48 J. FORENSIC SC1. 1318 (2003), available at
http://journalsip.astm.org/joumals/download/JFS2003121 486.8481-1.pdf, Jeff Wise &
Richard C. Li, The Futureof DNA Evidence, 19 CRIME & JUST. INT'L 31 (2003).
55 See Paul Root Wolpe et al., Emerging Technologiesfor Lie-Detection: Promises and
Perils, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39 (2005). Interestingly, at least one court has considered a
proffer of just such fMRI "brain fingerprinting" evidence in a post-conviction relief action.
In an unpublished ruling, the judge determined the technique to be sufficiently reliable to be
admitted into evidence as a general matter, but found that in the case at hand it was not
strong enough, given other evidence in the case, to justify a new trial. On appeal, the Iowa
Supreme Court overturned the lower court and ordered a new trial on other grounds, and so
did not reconsider the trial judge's "brain fingerprinting" ruling. Harrington v. Iowa, 659
N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003).
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Improvements in technology leading to a completely different style of
law enforcement are not limited to crimes with identifiable victims. The
war on drugs (and on fraud, and even organized crime and terrorism) has
similarly undergone a profound sea change in recent years. Though there
will always be a certain amount of effort aimed at low-level interception of
contraband in homes and cars, the future of law enforcement in these areas
appears to be computerized communication networks. The DEA is
increasingly using computer technologies to catch drug traffickers via their
inevitable use of the internet. They have launched a large "cyber initiative,"
which recognizes "that criminals in the drug trade are embracing the use of
56
21st century technology to peddle their poisons into U.S. communities.,
They are thus more and more likely to go after the money laundering-and
necessarily, the computer-dependant banking fraud that accompanies it-to
break up drug rings than to focus on the low-level dealing for which
consents to search during traffic stops would be helpful. 7 It's hard to
imagine this trend reversing.
I am suggesting what may sound like an implausibly futuristic Jetsonslike world. The idea that confessions would become irrelevant is unsettling,
if for no other reason than the ethical case for them. (Simply put, "People
ought to accept responsibility for wrongful acts that they commit," as Solan
and Tiersma write. 5 ) But I believe that our reluctance to dispense with the
need for confessions is less about a philosophy of moral responsibility, and
instead a product of a more general and recurrent skepticism in the law of
evidence to innovations that replace tried-and-true ways of discerning truth.
Innovations appear to challenge the hegemony of the trial itself as the
preferred method of discerning truth, and this is why they engender initial
resistance.
In a seminal article on the history of forensic photography, Jennifer
Mnookin outlined this very phenomenon.5 9 The photograph was almost
immediately recognized by the public as a powerful evidentiary tool for the
56 Press Release, DEA, DEA Disables Major Pharmaceutical Internet Scheme: New
"Virtual Enforcement Initiative" Announced (Sept. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/pressrel/pr092105.html.
57As DEA Administrator Karen P. Tandy phrased it, "Drug traffickers are using their
profits to burrow into our neighborhoods and corrupt legitimate banking systems. In major
drug trafficking operations, money is the thread that unravels the drugs and devastation
otherwise hidden by dealers. DEA knows where money leads, and we will be relentless in
going after it." Press Release, DEA, DEA Disables Large International Drug and Money
Laundering Organization (Dec. 8, 2005). available at http://www.dea.gov/pubs/pressrel/
prl20805.html.
58 SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 1, at 53.

59Jennifer Mnookin, The Image of Truth: PhotographicEvidence and the Power of
Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1998).
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courtroom. At the same time, it also produced profound skepticism:
commentators often wrote of its unreliability and manipulability (arguing,
for instance, not only that photographs could be staged, but also that
changing the focal length of the lens or altering the light could distort the
image).60 Courts split the baby and admitted photographs, but not as direct
evidence. Rather, they could only be admitted as mere aids to a witness's
own oral testimony. Doctrinally, photographs couldn't even act as
corroboration of testimony. They were analogized to maps or diagrams:
visual representations of a testifying witness's oral
they were simply
61
descriptions.
In practice, as the public (and the courts) became used to the specter of
photographs in trials, the doctrine evolved, and the doctrine that
photographs were never evidence themselves, but mere illustrative aids to
spoken testimony, quickly became a legal fiction.62 But why was the fiction
ever necessary? Why were courts reluctant to explicitly regard photographs
as direct evidence? Mnookin argues forcefully that judges saw photographs
as dangerously "certain," in a way that threatened the authority of courts
Photographs challenged the hegemony of words in the
themselves.
and
thus were perceived as challenging the 63need for trials
courtroom,
have a trial at all, with evidence so strong?
Why
altogether.
Thus mistrust combined with simple habit resulted in a somewhat
curious phenomenon: testifying witnesses describing what was obvious
from a photographic representation. For example, if a photograph of a
crime scene were admitted, a witness would have to describe what the
picture showed.64 That same sort of redundancy occurs in criminal trials
today, when presentations of both definitive DNA identification evidence
(often pinpointing a perpetrator with odds of one in quadrillions) are
coupled with evidence of spoken confessions. 65 For now, perhaps the
overkill makes sense: the memory of the O.J. Simpson jury's rejection of
DNA evidence is still recent enough to give prosecutors pause. And like
with the analogy of the early preference for oral testimony over
photographs, the confession still has an aura of legitimacy and
indispensability that DNA evidence doesn't presently match. But just as
60 Id. at 20-27.
61 Id. at 43-45.

Id. at 50.
Id. at 55-59.
6 Id. at 43-50.
65 See, e.g., People v. Sterling, 828 N.E.2d 1264 (I11.App. Ct. 2005); State v. Allen, 913
62
63

So.2d 788 (La. 2005); Minjarez v. State, No. AP-74592, 2005 WL 3061981 (Tex. Crim.
App. Nov. 16, 2005) (unpublished opinion).
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with photographs, DNA (and other technologically sophisticated
demonstrative evidence) is eventually bound to crowd out confessions.
And when it does, it will render our current preoccupation with getting both
the doctrine and the science of the confession era "right"-a preoccupation
front and center of Solan and Tiersma's masterful book-a relic of the past.
CONCLUSION

Speaking of Crime is an eminently readable overview of what the
science of linguistics has to offer the criminal law. The authors' ambition
to clarify complicated linguistics principles, and to underscore instances
where judges apply them inconsistently or badly, is fully realized in the
text. At the same time, the book illustrates the "state of the art" for a
domain that I believe is sliding into the past. Law enforcement practices,
and then by necessity the judges and juries, will rely less and less on
confessions by suspects as innovations in technologies (such as DNA
profiling, fMRI "lie detection," and computer fraud detection and
intervention) make confessions redundant, and even quaint. Because of
this, portions of the book felt to me a bit like the old joke about the scholar
who finished his definitive, multi-volume treatise on federal common law
the year Erie was decided: Solan and Tiersma update techniques for solving
some problems that I believe are disappearing from the scene altogether.
Perhaps this review is too speculative, or even absurdly futuristic: this
66
is always the risk when one argues as a hedgehog rather than as a fox.
Then again, it may seem so simply because of our recurrent fear that drastic
improvements in the accuracy of probabilistic evidence will make trials
themselves redundant, or at least change their character so dramatically that
their very legitimacy, which depends on beginning with an assumption of
innocence and ending with a democratic judgment by a jury of the
defendant's peers, will be lost. 67 I seriously doubt this will happen. Among
other things, not every case will yield enough forensic data for the new
techniques to process-there will always be some role for confessions,
however small. Furthermore, not every trial is about the identity of the
perpetrator-juries must still find, for example, mens rea, or even whether
there a crime was committed at all.68
66 PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: How GOOD IS IT? How CAN WE

KNOw? (2005).
67 Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1971).
68 The improving technologies promise to bring not only the end of the confession era,
but also the end of statutes of limitation. A primary justification for statutes of limitation is
that evidence degrades rapidly; not so for DNA evidence. This fact has led over half of the
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Despite the thesis of second half of this review, on no account do I
mean to suggest that one should skip Speaking of Crime. For one thing, we
are still in the confession era, and its doctrines and techniques are very
much present-the confession era's encroaching senescence is not yet fully
upon us (nor, perhaps may it ever be). More importantly, although Solan
and Tiersma styled their book as illuminating the criminal law, all of the
techniques of pragmatic linguistics they teach will continue to thrive in the
civil or constitutional domain. Indeed, their choice to restrict themselves to
criminal examples was probably somewhat arbitrary. Law is, after all,
fundamentally about words, and interpretation (of statutes, or contracts, or
whatever) will always play a central role. Any reader interested in the
psychology of language-and all lawyers should fall into that class-would
be well-served to read this book.

states to abolish their statutes of limitation for rape. Julia Preston, Powerof DNA Spurs Call
to Abolish State's Time Limit on Rape Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2006, at B 1.

